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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred By Granting Neal's Suppression Motion Because Sergeant
Yount's Investigative Detention Was Not Unreasonably Extended
During an automobile search, based on probable cause from a drug dog's alert,
officers found evidence of narcotics crimes in Neal's car. (R., pp.192-94.) While Neal
was booked into jail, officers also found heroin on his person. (R., p.194.) Neal moved
to suppress the evidence, asserting that the searches violated his constitutional rights.
(R., pp.117-18, 127-48.)

The district court granted Neal's suppression motion,

concluding that "Trooper Yount unlawfully extended the scope and duration of the stop
based solely on speculation" of a drug crime. (R., p.200.)
The state appealed, demonstrating that any expansion of the scope of Sergeant
Yount's investigation was supported by "the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded
to justify detaining an individual," and the detention was therefore never unreasonably
extended.

(Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.)

Sergeant Yount pulled over Neal at around

12:40 a.m. on reasonable suspicion of several traffic infractions: "failing to signal when
merging, failing to signal a lane change, and for window tinting darker than allowed by
law."

(R., pp.193, 197.)

Investigation of these infractions produced evidence of

additional criminal violations which led to additional investigations, including Neal's lack
of valid insurance, potential drug crimes, and a records check of Neal's probationary
status in Washington.

(R., p.193; see also Video at 12:44:00-1 :08:43.)

Before

Sergeant Yount had completed his various investigations, the drug detection dog
arrived on scene and alerted on Neal's vehicle.
In reaching its conclusion that the traffic stop was unreasonably extended, the
district court committed multiple errors.

First, as noted in the Appellant's brief, the
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district court erred when it determined that Sergeant Yount's suspicion of drug activity
was not reasonable because it failed to note, much less weigh, all of the circumstances
giving rise to the officer's reasonable suspicion. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-13.) Second,
even assuming that under the totality of all of the circumstances Sergeant Yount lacked
reasonable suspicion of drug activity, the traffic stop still was not unreasonably
extended. As shown by the video, a large portion of Sergeant Yount's investigation
prior to the arrival of the drug detection dog was focused on checking Neal's records
and verifying his probationary status. (See Video at 12:57:00-1 :05:30.) As argued in
the appellant's brief, that records check was a reasonable part of a traffic stop.
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) But the district court failed to consider that investigation in
its analysis. And that was error, too.
In response, Neal asserts that the district court's "legal conclusion, that Officer
Yount's extended detention was not supported by sufficient facts 'to support a
reasonable suspicion of drug activity' is based upon its view of Officer Yount's credibility
and assessment of factual inferences in the case, all of which is vested in the trial
court."

(Respondent's brief, p.13 (citation omitted).) While credibility determinations

may be the sole province of the trier of fact, its factual findings still must be supported
by substantial evidence. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct.
App. 2006).

("We defer to the trial court's findings of fact, however, unless those

findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record and are
therefore clearly erroneous.") As shown in the state's opening brief, the trial court's
factual findings regarding the basis for Sergeant Yount's reasonable suspicion were not
supported by substantial evidence.

(See Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.) Moreover, the
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court's factual findings regarding Neal's appearance, based, according to the district
court, on its review of the video (R., pp.198-99) are in fact contradicted by that video.
(See Appellant's brief, p.12 with citations to Video.)
Citing to State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996), Neal
asserts that the state "waived any objection" that the court's findings were "clearly
erroneous" by failing, he claims, "to present argument or authority."

(Respondent's

brief, p.13, n.5.) But the state provided both. In its standard of review section, the state
set out the controlling authority: A trial court's factual findings must be supported by
substantial evidence.

(Appellant's brief, p.5.) The state then argued that the district

court's factual findings regarding the accuracy of the officer's description of Neal's
appearance, as shown by the video, were clearly erroneous. (Appellant's brief, pp.1112.) Factual findings which are "unsupported by substantial and competent evidence ...
are ... clearly erroneous." Covert, 143 Idaho at 170, 139 P.3d at 772.
Again citing to Zichko, Neal asserts that the state failed to provide authority for its
arguments regarding Sergeant Yount's investigation of Neal's probation status.
(Appellant's brief, p.14.)

Again, contrary to Neal's assertions, the state both cited

authority and provided argument. It cited Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609,
1615 (2015), for the uncontroversial proposition that "[a] records check is an expected
part of a traffic stop and does not constitute undue delay"; and it cited Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006) and State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 209, 207
P.3d 182, 185 (2009), for the proposition that probationers enjoy a reduced expectation
of privacy. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) The state argued, based on this authority, that
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checking a probationer's status is analytically the same as any other records check and
is reasonable, even though it may take a few minutes longer. (Id.)
"[T]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (internal quotation omitted).

Ohio v.

The reasonableness

standard does not require perfectly optimized police efficiency. While noting that the
traffic stop lasted 26 minutes prior to the drug dog's alert, the district court failed to
consider the totality of the circumstances justifying the detention.

Application of the

correct legal standards to this case demonstrates that Sergeant Yount's investigative
detention was not unreasonably extended because each expansion of that investigation
was supported by "the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an
individual."

See Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615.

The district court's order should

therefore be reversed and this case remanded.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
granting Neal's suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 27th day of November, 2015.

~p...SP_E_N_C_E_R_ _ __
Deputy Attorney General
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